RM600 Million MRT Refurbishment: Who Will Answer for the Missing Trains?

The controversy over seven MRT Kajang Line train sets sitting with SMH Rail is being framed primarily as a contractor's failure to return trains on time. That is certainly a legitimate question. But it is not the only one.

More importantly, it is a question that Transport Minister Anthony Loke should answer.

A close to RM600 million Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) programme was awarded to SMH Rail in 2024 to refurbish all 58 train sets operating on the MRT Kajang Line. More than two years later, seven remain with the contractor.

Scoop reported that none of the seven had been returned to Rapid Rail when it published its report, while only 38 of the 58 sets were fully serviceable after accounting for trains undergoing overhaul, those awaiting spare parts and three unavailable because of accidents. 

It also reported that MRT Corp had granted SMH Rail two extensions of time. (scoop.my)

MRT Corp's subsequent statement says seven train sets have been released to SMH Rail and that additional trains will only be released when completed sets are returned. Four are now expected back in December 2026.

That leads to the first question.

Why have seven trains still not been returned?

SMH Rail must answer for its performance. A contractor entrusted with a major public railway MRO programme cannot simply point to the complexity of engineering and long-lead components when delivery falls substantially behind schedule. But accountability does not stop with the contractor.

If seven trains can remain with a contractor for more than two years, the public is entitled to know what contractual safeguards were in place, whether they were enforced and why extensions of time were granted.

The latest decision by MRT Corp not to release additional trains until completed sets are returned appears sensible. But it also raises a second question.

Why was this safeguard not sufficient from the beginning?

A major railway MRO contract should normally contain clear turnaround requirements, milestone payments, performance guarantees, liquidated damages and consequences for repeated delays. Were these provisions included?

If they were, were they activated? And if not, why?

The answers matter because the issue is not simply the whereabouts of seven trains. It is the protection of public money and the availability of an essential public transport service.

Was payment genuinely progressive — or was substantial money paid upfront?

This is potentially the most important financial question. Scoop reported that payments under the nearly RM600 million contract were being made progressively according to agreed milestones. (scoop.my) MRT Corp's latest statement says hundreds of replacement parts have already been delivered to its warehouse, with partial payments made for parts received.

Yet sources familiar with the programme have raised a different question whether SMH Rail was paid substantially, or even fully, before the corresponding trains were delivered. That allegation should not be presented as established fact without documentary evidence. But it is a legitimate question for MRT Corp and the Ministry of Transport.

• How much of the RM600 million has actually been paid?
• What percentage remains unpaid?
• What precisely triggers each payment?
• Is it completion of a train, delivery of parts, procurement of long-lead components, engineering milestones or another contractual event?

There is a significant difference between “progressive payment” and payments that are progressively protected by verified physical delivery. The contract, payment schedule and payment certificates should settle the matter.

Why are parts for a relatively young railway system unavailable for years?

MRT Corp says hundreds of replacement parts have arrived, but 22 parts are only expected in 2027 because of production lead times. Three parts are becoming obsolete, with replacement models expected from 2028. Existing models will continue to be used in the interim, while 25 remaining parts will be progressively retrofitted.

There is nothing inherently unusual about individual electronic or control components becoming obsolete before an entire railway system reaches the end of its useful life.

But this raises an obvious question:

When was the obsolescence and long-lead-time risk identified?

If these problems were known when the RM600 million programme was designed, why were they not incorporated into the delivery schedule? If they were not known, why was an adequate parts and obsolescence assessment not conducted before the contract was awarded?

These questions are particularly relevant when the programme involves trains that began entering service only in 2016.

Why RM600 million — and was it justified?

The largest unanswered question may ultimately be whether the programme itself represents value for money. At approximately RM10.3 million per train set, RM600 million is a substantial investment in rolling stock that is roughly a decade old.

That does not mean refurbishment is unnecessary. Rail rolling stock is a long-life asset and major overhaul can be entirely justified. 

• But what exactly does each RM10.3 million buy?
• How much is for parts, labour, engineering, technical support and testing?
• How much additional service life will the expenditure provide?
• What would continued maintenance have cost?
• What alternatives were considered?
• And at what point would replacing the trains become more economical than refurbishment?

These are reasonable questions for a public investment of this scale.

Does Loke inherit the problems — but own the response?

It is fair to acknowledge that many of the problems facing Malaysia's rail system did not originate under Anthony Loke's current tenure.

The Kajang Line trains, the original maintenance arrangements and many procurement decisions predate his return as Transport Minister. But political responsibility works differently from historical responsibility.

A minister may inherit a problem, but if it remains unresolved under his watch, he will inevitably be judged for it.

Loke has made rail reliability a prominent part of his agenda. He has pushed Prasarana to improve maintenance and service-disruption performance and has also pressed government rail operators towards faster fleet renewal.

There have been measurable improvements in Prasarana's reported disruption figures. That should be acknowledged.

But critics have also noticed what they regard as a recurring pattern in his responses to transport-sector problems. Whenever a failure or delay occurs, the responsible agency is pressed for answers, corrective measures or penalties are announced, and the response then moves towards accelerating procurement or replacing equipment.

Sometimes that may be exactly what is required. But it creates a legitimate policy question.

Is Malaysia solving its railway problems through lifecycle asset management, or repeatedly through new procurement?

The distinction matters when a relatively young fleet is simultaneously undergoing a RM600 million refurbishment while government pressure continues for new trains elsewhere in the system.

Who will answer for the RM600 million?

SMH Rail must answer for its delivery performance. MRT Corp must answer for how the contract was structured, supervised and extended. MOT must answer for oversight. And the Transport Minister should answer for the policy and governance framework under which the programme was undertaken.

Loke should therefore address the questions directly rather than leaving MRT Corp's holding statement to carry the burden. The public does not need another assurance that four trains are expected in December. It needs to know:

• How much has been paid?
• What has actually been delivered?
• Why were extensions granted?
• Were the spare-parts risks known when the contract was awarded?
• Why will some components only arrive in 2027 or 2028?
• Why does the refurbishment cost nearly RM600 million?
• And what protection does the government have if delivery continues to fall behind?

The issue is no longer simply where the seven trains are. It is whether a RM600 million public investment was properly planned, properly contracted, properly paid for and properly supervised. That is the accountability the travelling public — and the taxpayer — should expect.